Short abstract: This article analyses how financial services institutions address the threat from insiders, and in particular, how they respond to and recover from damaging insider-threat incidents.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the number and scale of attacks carried out by insiders has seen a steady increase. 1 Financial services firms, in particular, have been frequent targets of insider attacks. 2 Historically, information security efforts of financial services firms have centred on defending external borders from intrusion by nefarious outsiders. More recently however, security debates have broadened to include trusted employees, contractors, and business partners. 3 Financial services institutions have grown increasingly aware of the changing threat landscape and the debilitating effects of insider attacks on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial data and systems. 4 While insider threat awareness levels have increased over the years, insider threat management practices remain to be better understood. Little is known about the spectrum of measures taken by financial services firms in response to insider attacks. In an attempt to acquire a better and more comprehensive understanding of insider threat response and recovery practices, the article seeks to address the following questions: How do financial services firms tackle insider threat? How do they respond to insider threat incidents? And what means of recovery do they employ?
For the purpose of this article, insiders are defined as current or former employees, contractors, or business partners who have or had authorised access to an organisation s network system or data and have exceeded or used that access intentionally or unintentionally, in a manner that adversely affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organisation s network, system, or data. 5 Combining industry reports, academic literature, and semi-structured interviews with senior financial services security professionals, this article moves away from a purely theoretical investigation, and pays due regard to the practical realities of insider threat management.
The remainder of this article is organised along four sections. The first section reviews relevant background literature on insider threat management. The second section provides a short industry overview and outlines the research aim and methodology of the article. The third section presents and discusses the findings obtained from industry reports, semi-structured expert interviews, and secondary literature research, and highlights best practices. The fourth section summarises the results.
RELATED WORK
Insider threat has advanced to an issue of growing concern and significance, a fact also reflected in the soaring number of publications dedicated to the topic. 6 Contributions cover a wider range of different themes spanning from behavioural research to technical attack modelling. 7 10 Insider threat management denotes an emerging focus area of operational risk and information security management. It is concerned with addressing the security threats posed to organisations by trusted individuals who have intricate knowledge of internal operations and processes, and/or access to sensitive systems and data. 11 The key building blocks of effective insider threat management mirror those expressed in the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and include: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. 12 The framework allows organisations to individually assess threats most relevant to their operations and to develop a risk-based approach to resource allocation . 13 It enables organisations to express their insider threat management efforts in terms of critical assets (identify), implemented controls and safeguards (protect), manifested threats (detect), formulated incident response strategies (respond), and business continuity plans (recover).
Much of the research on insider threat management has focused on pre-emptive protection and detection strategies. Sasaki, for example, promotes a detection framework based on psychological triggers that impels insiders to behave suspiciously. 14 Legg et al advocate a tiered insider threat detection model that incorporates elements from enterprise, people, technology, information, and physical domains. 15 Nurse et al introduced a framework for characterising, and later, detecting insider attacks, based on technical, psychological and behavioural factors. 16 And Hashem et al advance an insider threat monitoring and detection framework based on human bio-signals (electroencephalography and electrocardiogram signals). 17 In contrast, response and recovery tactics have received less scholarly attention.
However, the continuous surge in the number of insider threat incidents warrants closer examination of organisational response and recovery strategies. 18 20 Neither protection nor detection schemes offer absolute security. Trusted insiders often have intimate knowledge about the controls and detection mechanisms in place and are able to side-step existing physical and electronic security measures by legitimate means. No single prevention or detection framework can guarantee total security, which is why adequate response and recovery strategies are all the more important. Trzeciak holds It is essential that organisations take the necessary steps to ensure organisational resilience by implementing and regularly testing response and recovery processes 21 According to research conducted by the National Cybersecurity Institute, incident response is a complex undertaking, involving a wide range of organisational departments. Insider threat incidents are motivated by a combination of tech-nical, behavioural, and organisational factors. As a result, effective management requires a disciplined, risk-based, cross-functional, approach that includes corporate security, Information Technology (IT), information security, legal, Human Resources (HR), audit, and other relevant control functions.
Insider threat response and recovery strategies are of critical importance to an organisation s overall security posture They are key constituents of successful insider threat management, and worthy of more comprehensive analysis.
CONTEXT, RESEARCH AIM AND METHODOLOGY
The main objective of this article is to examine the insider threat response and There exist various types of financial services firms, including banks, insurance companies, asset management boutiques, credit card companies, consumer finance enterprises, stock brokerages, investment funds, and government sponsored entities. 22 As custodians of highly sensitive data and valuable physical assets, financial services institutions represent prime targets of information attack. According to research conducted by Websense Security Labs, financial services firms are under constant barrage by cybercriminals On average financial services businesses are attacked 300 percent more than other institutions 23 Attacks carried out by internal miscreants rank among the most pressing information security challenges of financial services firms. Cases such as Morgan Stanley, underline the severity of insider threat for financial services firms.
In order to acquire a better and more comprehensive understanding of the insider threat response and recovery strategies of financial services firms, the article employs qualitative means of data collection and analysis. Qualitative methods subsume a broad collection of naturalistic, interpretative approaches, focused on exploring phenomena from the inside. Qualitative methods describe a set of interpretive material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations 24 They are particularly suitable for scholarly ventures aiming to obtain a better understanding and sense of real world complexities and intricate social phenomena.
Methodologically, the article draws on a number of different sources, including secondary academic literature on insider threat management, primary materials on industry developments, as well as semi-structured interviews with senior financial services security professionals.
A total of five semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior financial services security professionals. Interviews were given some structure using an Patterns/themes within the data collected were identified, analysed, and reported with help of thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a research technique that minimally organises and describes data sets in rich detail 25 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This section reports and discusses the theoretical and empirical results of the study. The findings are organised along the research questions outlined earlier.
How do financial services firms tackle insider threat?
Incidents of fraud, theft, and abuse, emanating from internal miscreants, present financial services firms with serious challenges. Launched with intricate knowledge of internal processes and procedures such threats have the ability to create sizable risks in relation to digital assets and are also the most challenging to manage 26 Empirical evidence confirms the prevalence of insider threat across financial services enterprises. With the exception of one interviewee, participants confirmed that their respective organisations have been subject to insider attacks.
In line with industry accounts, participants reported that the majority of insider attacks are based on financial motivations and frequently involve data theft.
Other motives exist, eg revenge, disgruntlement, or corporate espionage, but are less prevalent.
Participants mentioned that security breaches emanate from all types of roles and responsibilities. They further stated that the handling of insider incidents is highly complex and challenging. Effective insider threat management usually involves a great number of different stakeholders, and is often done behind closed doors so as to avoid negative publicity and reputational damage.
The fact that the majority of insider threat cases are dealt with internally and go unreported, limits the positive effects of data sharing and leaves industry partners vulnerable to risks because those that hire these individuals in the future have no way to assess their threat potential 27 Rather than constituting a separate policy domain, respondents confirmed that insider threat is generally addressed in the context of wider risk management.
With the exception of one financial services organisation, none of the firms surveyed had stand-alone insider threat handling policies in place. Given the severity of the risk, however, dedicated insider threat policies would help embed the issue more firmly and permanently. Policy commitment and adherence are absolutely critical for addressing insider breaches in a systematic and robust manner. Although, from a corporate/strategic perspective, a certain level of reluctance to involve third parties might be justifiable, engaging with law enforcement agencies can yield certain benefits. First of all, it can help recover damages and protect (intellectual) property, and second of all, it can help prevent other organisations from hiring charged internal miscreants in the future.
Financial services firms should consider the full spectrum of disciplinary options, including legal measures, when responding to insider threat incidents.
Merely dismissing insiders defers a potentially dangerous problem to another unsuspecting enterprise. 32 At the same time, pursuing an approach that is too heavy-handed can create pitfalls for financial services firms where none used to In line with secondary research, respondents confirmed that incident review and integration of response learnings are key success factors for effective recovery. 34 Insider threat recovery requires the cooperation of an entire organisation, not just the technical departments and security functions. Reducing follow-up activities to IT and security departments runs the risk of excluding other corporate functions that also play a crucial role in incident recovery, and inhibits organisational learning.
Lessons learned have to be incorporated into company-wide incident response plans, and have to be communicated to wider staff accordingly. This allows employees to get acquainted with organisational insider threat response measures and helps them understand that insider threat incidents are taken seriously. Jason has published several articles at both journal and conference levels and also sits on the programme committee of related venues. His research interests include insider threat, information security and trust, investigating the risks to identity security and privacy online, mobile device security, human factors of security and insider threats.
